The Iran-Israel Nexus: Is Conflict Inevitable?

October 2nd 2007
Report by Lawrence Joffe

Perceptions might not be everything, but they certainly count for a lot.
So it would seem judging from a fascinating discussion hosted by JFJHR
concerning the vexed question of rising tensions between Israel and Iran.
 
Chaired by Sir Geoffrey Bindman, visiting professor of law at University
College London, the discussion began with illuminating presentations by
three well-placed experts, before being opened up to the floor. The
first speaker was Peter David, foreign editor of /The Economist/. Next
came Prof. Naomi Chazan, former Israeli Knesset member, peace campaigner
and academic. The last to speak was Prof. Anoush Ehteshami, professor of
international relations at Durham University.
 
*Peter David*, who wrote an acclaimed report on Iran in July following a
long visit to that country, began by setting current worries in the
context of a “bigger picture”. Certainly, he argued, 2008 would spell a
dangerous phase with the confluence of two phenomena – technical
progress towards Iran’s likely building of nuclear weapons, and the
timetable for elections in the USA.
 
After analysing the psychological and domestic political hinterland
behind Israeli fears, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s more
incendiary threats, David concluded by listing five likely future
scenarios. Of the five options, David suggested that the most likely was
a “grand bargain” between the USA and Iran based on “common interests”.
Such a bargain might defuse the current tensions. But before it could
work, more groundwork was needed to create the right conditions. And
there was still the risk that things could go seriously wrong.
 
As if to illustrate the high stakes at play, David noted that Iran could
build a bomb within eight years at most, said the IAEA. Even Iran’s
traditional backers, Russia and China, insisted that the UN should stop
Iran’s process back in July 2006, but to no avail.
 
Iran had also “climbed up George Bush’s list of scapegoats as things got
worse in Iraq”. Bush has often described Iran as “evil”; his stated
creed is to deny “the worst weapons to the worst regimes”. So what is to
prevent him from ending his term “with a bang” by launching a
pre-emptive strike, asked David?
 
In answer to his own question, David listed some sensible barriers to
rash action. These included doubts about where Iran’s facilities lie,
and the realisation that Iran could rebuild its project with easily
accessible fissile fuel. There were also political fears: might not an
attack merely galvanise ordinary Iranians around what is an increasingly
unpopular regime? And perhaps Iranian retaliation could be more
dangerous than a US attack. Conceivably they could close down the
Straits of Hormuz, bolster terrorism, or turn the US army in Iraq into
“our hostage”.
 
If rationality might preclude perilous action by the USA, surely the
same analysis does not apply with Tehran. Yet, here, too, David
suggested that things were not all they seemed. To be sure, ever since
Ahmadinejad took power in 2005, anti-Israel rhetoric has mounted
alarmingly. Expressions like “removing Israel from the pages of history”
hardly inspire confidence.
 
That said, argued David, these belligerent views are not new. Ever since
1979, Ayatollah Khomeini denied the right for a Jewish state to exist in
the region. Official Iranian ideology remains unchanged; only the overt
nature of threats is a new feature.
 
So why might that be? Maybe, suggested David, Ahmadinejad and his clique
were trying to “rekindle a revolution that was beginning to run out of
steam”. Radicals tend to evoke “permanent revolution” and spout slogans
that don’t require “delivery”. Perhaps we are seeing an attempt to
divert attention from unfulfilled revolutionary promises, combined with
an “opportunistic commitment to liberating Palestine” and a desire to
break the bonds of perceived Iranian isolation.
 
Of course, this still does not tell us how powerful the hardliners
really are. Nor does it suggest how fierce words might lead, even
unwittingly, to irreversible and disastrous actions. For that, the
audience had to await Prof. Ehteshami’s more detailed insights into the
labyrinthine workings of the Iranian system.
 
David acknowledged Israel’s “genuine fears”, but discounted the idea
that Israel would strike first. Even if Iran /did/ acquire nuclear
bombs, said David, that would not necessarily be catastrophic. “The
regime is not suicidal, despite its links with suicide bombers”, he noted.
 
Finally, what about that “grand bargain”, a solution that today seems
fantastical? Well, explained David, Iran and the USA both want a united,
Shia-led Iraq; they both want to prevent the Taliban from retaking
Afghanistan; and for economic reasons, both want to protect the Persian
Gulf. With such shared interests, he concluded, a saving compromise
might – just – be feasible.
 
To *Naomi Chazan* there was no doubt about whether Israelis see Iran as
a threat. “On this question there is a very loud affirmative, a broad
consensus”. However, closer inspection revealed differences of emphasis
that could lead to wildly differing courses of action.
 
“On the one hand”, she said, “it seems like we are on a collision
course. On the other, direct confrontation is not inevitable”. Admitting
that she would be concentrating solely on Israeli perspectives – a bit
like the old joke, “The elephant and the Jewish question” – Chazan
described a threefold threat. First, an ideological desire to threaten
Israel’s very existence; second, Iran’s role in financing terror groups
and hostile regimes; and third, a specific nuclear strike whose first
target would be Israel (and because of geographical proximity,
paradoxically, Palestine).
 
Nonetheless, conceptions of the Iranian threat’s seriousness and urgency
depended on what Chazan dubbed “four and a half options”. First came the
“alarmists” who worry about everything concerning Iran, and see it as
Israel’s greatest enemy. This school includes Likud, rightwing
think-tanks and some of the Israeli military. The second category,
representing the official government line of Kadima and mainstream
Labour, emphasises the nuclear danger. Thirdly come “those unsure how to
think” – they dislike Iran’s attempt to undermine Israel’s legitimacy,
yet concede that other issues on the national agenda are more pressing.
 
Public opinion represents a fourth category. What really “offends” them,
said Chazan, is demonising rhetoric and Holocaust denial. Details about
specific security threats do not really interest them. And finally there
are the “half-option” people, so called because they still remain so few
in number. Chazan dubbed them the “much ado about nothing crowd”.
Generally these are leftwing dissidents who say that “crying wolf” about
others’ nuclear weaponry (viz. Iran) will inevitably lead the world to
query Israel’s own nuclear capability…
 
Before predicting what might happen, cautioned Chazan, we should
consider other factors. For instance, most Israelis know precious little
about Iran, and this “ignorance fuels a sense of fear”. Additionally,
those who reject talking to Palestinians tend to over-emphasize the
Iranian threat. Plus views on Iran differ according to which US group
Israelis affiliate with: moderate Democrats or neo-con inspired Republicans.
 
Domestic political considerations play a role, too, just as in Iran.
Whenever a government is in trouble – as Olmert’s clearly is –
politicians tend to do two things simultaneously, noted Chazan, who
heads the School of Government at the Academic College of
Tel-Aviv-Yaffo. They raise security to the top of the agenda, and also
talk about peace. This is exactly what Olmert has done. Coupled with the
mysterious action in eastern Syria, the result has been an overnight
leap in his approval rating from 6% to 18%.
 
Like David, Chazan felt an Osirak 1981-type first strike by Israel was
unlikely. The prevailing view regarding Iran was “let America or others
carry the load”. Psychologically, many feel of Iran: “Ignore them – why
give them the satisfaction of worrying us?” Others think that Iran is
too complicated; rather let their reformists battle militants and don’t
interfere.
 
Finally, many feel – including Prof Chazan herself – that Israel should
stress peace-making closer to home. “Embrace the Arab League initiative,
utilise the opening that exists on the Palestinian front, and separate
Syria from its dependence on Iran”. Pursuing this argument, Chazan
envisaged a daring reconfiguration of the old Israeli “strategy of the
periphery”. In the past that meant seeking friends amongst distant
“outer ring” non-Arab players, so as to counter hostile Arabs. Israel’s
key ally then was Persian Iran. Now, mused Chazan, we should think of a
“reverse strategy” – an alliance with moderate Sunni neighbour states,
thus creating a friendly buffer against radical outsiders like Iran in
the north and possibly Sudan to the south.
 
If Prof Chazan called Iran’s system complicated, Tehran-born* Prof
Anoush Ehteshami* more than bore out that perception in his talk! Yet,
like his co-speakers, he did so with admirable clarity.
 
A prolific author and acknowledged expert on the minutiae of Iranian
politics, Ehteshami concentrated on four areas: regional politics, the
“Ahmadinejad factor”, the legacy of the revolution, and, finally,
whether conflict was inevitable.
 
Iran’s 1979 revolution, he reminded listeners, was a pivotal event whose
centrality should never be underestimated. It brought religion to power
for the first time in the modern age, it marked a challenge for all
Muslims, and its ideology coloured all that followed, including
Ahmadinejad’s jaundiced “them and us” approach. Historically, the “new
Iran” wanted to distance itself completely from the Shah’s time; so if
Israel was then Iran’s chief ally, now it was the Little Satan.
 
Probably most potently, the revolution symbolised independence for
Iranians; it gave them “a sense of being in control of their destiny”.
Possessing nuclear power thus expressed a desire for national
assertiveness, a sign that “we have arrived”.
 
As for Iran’s power structure, joked Ehteshami, “it is so complicated,
even Machiavelli would have been pleased”. Mostly the world sees
Ahmadinejad as dominant; but as president, albeit elected, he is just
one player amongst many. He leads the revolution, but not the state.
Many institutions act as checks and balances. There is the parliament,
the 12 guardians (all clerics) and the Supreme Guide, currently Ali
Khamenei, plus sundry other councils, committees and factions, each with
powerful patrons. Added to the mix are interest groups, including those
who, like Ahmadinejad, believe in the imminent revelation of a “hidden
imam”.
 
Yet even this labyrinthine set-up, admitted Ehteshami, could not solve
all problems. Iran is one of the leading producers of oil, and the price
has rocketed to $75 a barrel; yet the country still has to import
petrol. Firms aspire to free trade, but are enmeshed in the state
apparatus. Furthermore, Iran’s young population – 70% are below 30 years
old – faces dire unemployment. Billions of dollars worth of know-how
leaves the country each year in the shape of Iran’s “fourth export”:
people. Even amongst the ayatollahs, many fiercely dislike the whole
experiment of “politicising religion”.
 
In regional terms, Iran’s success owes much to others’ weakness, said
Ehteshami. Iran has benefited from Arab troubles arising out of Egypt’s
peace treaty with Israel, the ruinous Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, Iraq’s
foolish invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the spotlight cast on Saudi Arabia
due to 9/11, and finally the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Bush actually
did Iran a favour, said Ehteshami, by removing two of Tehran’s greatest
rivals: Saddam in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. With Iraq’s
collapse, Iran has a longer reach and the supposed barrier between Iran
and Israel is no more.
 
Turning to Ahmadinejad, Ehteshami called him “Bush’s mirror, a neo-con
par excellence”. Like his US nemesis, he feels you are either with him
or against him. Agreeing with Peter David, Ehteshami suggested that
Holocaust denial was his own obsession, more so than his people’s. A
successful combiner of “religion, populism and nationalism”, he is a
rabble-rouser who also shuts up people who want dialogue at home.
Likewise his failure to eradicate poverty, as promised, might yet
provoke a large political backlash. In short, Ahmadinejad may not be as
all-powerful as his detractors make him out to be.
 
Lastly, is conflict “inevitable”? Iran certainly evinces negative
characteristics in US eyes: it supports “terror”, wants to possess WMD,
abuses human rights and opposes Israeli Palestinian peace. Washington
also fears the prospect of nuclear proliferation across the region. But
whether this constitutes a definite clash to come is less certain.
 
**
 
At *question time* an Iraqi foreign ministry official queried whether
Iran really was happy with Saddam’s fall, and noted that, in his view,
Iran did not truly back the Shia in Iraq. In response, Peter David said
Iran was glad at Saddam’s demise, though it possibly feared the
precedent might lead to their toppling, too.
 
Another questioner wondered whether Israel may talk to Hamas – possibly
within the context of Chazan’s “new openings”? David admitted that
privately Israeli decision-makers conceded this possibility; but
publicly, it was not mooted. Prof Chazan rejoined that Israel would talk
to Hamas, “but not tomorrow”. However, if the forthcoming peace summit
dealt only in the vague generalities, then pressure to talk directly to
Hamas would increase. Chazan also noted that Israel ignored the first
draft of the Arab League proposal in 2002, a plan that “from a purely
Israeli perspective [implies] Israel’s dream since 1948”. Now, five
years later, it is embracing it so enthusiastically that it may risk
“strangling it”!
 
Someone else suggested that Iran was using Palestinians as a “decoy”.
Ehteshami countered that Palestine was no “marginal issue”, adding that
the Arab League plan was significant, especially as Saudis were not
known for “sticking their necks out”.
 
Responding to a view that the panel was “overly optimistic”, Peter David
said he thought “we were all sounding quite gloomy”. That said, he
reiterated that “cold realities” would dictate caution, and may prevent
a doomsday scenario. He particularly scorned ideas that Iran might
strike Washington itself.
 
“Pessimists”, noted Chazan, “are optimists who feel they can’t change
the outcome”. But if problems were clearly identified, you could effect
change. Regarding specifics, she worried about two former Israeli prime
ministers, Netanyahu and Barak, competing as to who could sound tougher
on Iran…
 
So did Iran see Israel as a threat, asked another questioner? Peter
David thought not. A greater problem, in the view of many Iranians, even
if not expressed openly, was that Iran was defying the UN and IAEA.
Hence the desire to escape isolation was having the opposite effect.
Ehteshami added that one good by-product of the crisis was that nations
were queuing up to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Pact.
 
Several audience members felt that Ahmadinejad had been quoted out of
context, or even mistranslated. Ehteshami disagreed: reading his own
translations of the president’s words, he showed that Ahmadinejad was,
or at least sounded, unequivocal. “Don’t defend him on any account; what
he says decreases grounds for optimism”, said Ehteshami in a view fully
supported by Peter David.
 
One Kurdish questioner reminded the audience of his people’s plight at
the hands of Iran, their past friendship with Israel, and the relative
safety of Kurdish northern Iraq. In response to other questions, panel
members discussed Iran’s threat to Gulf Arab states, as well last year’s
Israeli-Hizbollah war, which “regionalised the conflict” and proved that
“you cannot manage security by remote control”.
 
These were just a few instances of a lively, intense yet informative
meeting, one that succeeded, probably beyond expectations, in teasing
out complexities. As to solutions, the jury was out, as the chair may
have said. At least the audience learnt that perceptions, as much as
“operative realities”, will probably determine what will happen in the
nervous months to come…

Last update: Sunday, October 21, 2007 at 9:31:23 PM
Copyright 2009 Jewish Forum for Justice and Human Rights